Models in Multicriteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) can be analyzed by means of an importance index and an interaction index for every group of criteria. We consider first discrete models in MCDA, without further restriction, which amounts to considering multichoice games, that is, cooperative games with several levels of participation. We propose and axiomatize two interaction indices for multichoice games: the signed interaction index and the absolute interaction index. In a second part, we consider the continuous case, supposing that the continuous model is obtained from a discrete one by means of the Choquet integral. We show that, as in the case of classical games, the interaction index defined for continuous aggregation functions coincides with the (signed) interaction index, up to a normalizing coefficient.
Introduction
An important issue in MultiCriteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) is to be able to analyze and explain a numerical model, obtained by elicitation of preferences of the decision maker. A classical way to do this is to assess the importance of each criterion (see a general approach to define an importance index in (Ridaoui et al., 2017a) ). This description of the model may appear to be sufficient in the case of simple models, which are additive in essence (e.g., additive utility models), as it is well known that they imply mutual preferential independence of criteria (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976) . However, in case of more complex models, the preferential independence among criteria does not hold any more, and interaction appears among criteria, so that a description of the model by the sole importance indices is not sufficient any more. For example, for models where aggregation of preference is done through a Choquet integral w.r.t. a capacity, an interaction index is defined for any group of criteria (Grabisch and Labreuche, 2010) , which is a generalization of the interaction index for pairs of criteria proposed by Murofushi and Soneda (1993) . Roughly speaking, a positive interaction index induces a conjunctive behavior (like the minimum operator), while a negative interaction index induces a disjunctive behavior (maximum).
The aim of the paper is to propose an axiomatic foundation of an interaction index for a MCDA model with no special restriction (and in particular, mutual preferential independence is not supposed to hold). In a first step, the attributes are supposed to be defined on a finite universe. Then, such a model is equivalent to what is called a multichoice game in game theory (Hsiao and Raghavan, 1993) , that is, a game on a set of players N , where each player can play at a level of participation represented by an integer between 0 and k. Up to our knowledge, there is no definition of an interaction index for multichoice games. Nevertheless, there exists a general form of interaction index for games on lattices (Grabisch and Labreuche, 2007) , and multichoice games with k levels can be considered as games on the lattice (k + 1)
N . This interaction index is defined, however, for any element of the lattice x ∈ (k +1) N , i.e., any profile of participation of the players. This does not make sense for our purpose, since we are looking for an interaction index defined for groups of players/criteria. It is the contribution of this paper to provide two definitions for an interaction index, and to give a characterization of them. The first one is a natural generalization of the interaction index for classical games, which we call signed interaction index as it can take positive or negative values. The second one is an absolute interaction index, because it cumulates only amounts of interaction without considering its signs. The latter permits to avoid cancellation of local interaction effects, yielding counterintuitive results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the necessary material and notation. Section 3 summarizes previous works on the interaction index (the case of classical games and the case of games on lattices). Our work on the importance index for multichoice games is summarized in Section 4, since some of the axioms are necessary for our approach. Section 5 and 6 give the main results of the paper, which are the definition and characterization of two interaction indices for multichoice games, and consequently for general discrete MCDA models. In Section 7, we address the continuous case, supposing that the model is obtained from a discrete one via the Choquet integral.
Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, the cardinality of sets will be denoted by corresponding lower case letters, i.e., |N | := n, |S| := s, etc. For notational convenience, we will omit braces for singletons, i.e., S ∪ {i} is written S ∪ i, etc.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a fixed and finite set which can be thought as the set of attributes or criteria (in MCDA), players (in cooperative game theory), etc., depending on the domain of application. In this paper, we will mainly focus on MCDA applications. We suppose that each attribute i ∈ N takes values in a set L i , which is supposed to be finite 1 and denoted by L i = {0, 1, . . . , k i }. The alternatives are represented as elements of the Cartesian product L := L 1 × . . . × L n . An alternative is thus written as a vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) where x i ∈ L i for all i ∈ N . For each x ∈ L, we denote by S(x) = {i ∈ N | x i > 0} the support of x, and by K(x) = {i ∈ N |x i = k i } the kernel of x.
For each i ∈ N , we denote by L −i the set × j =i L j . For each y −i ∈ L −i , and any ∈ L i , (y −i , i ) denotes the compound alternative x such that x i = and x j = y j , ∀j = i. More generally, for any T ∈ 2 N \ {∅}, for any x, y ∈ L, (x T , y −T ) denotes the compound alternative, while L T and L −T denote the restricted Cartesian products of attributes.
The vector 0 N = (0, . . . , 0) is the null alternative of L, and k N = (k 1 , . . . , k n ) is the top element of L. Similarly, we use the notation 0 T , 1 T , k T , etc., for any T ∈ 2 N \ {∅}. With some abuse, we also often make use of (k − 1) T ∈ L T as a shorthand for
The preferences of a Decision Maker (DM) over the alternatives are supposed to be represented by a function v : L → R. For the sake of generality, we do not make any assumption on v, except that
For convenience, we assume from now on that all attributes have the same number of elements, i.e., k i = k for every i ∈ N (k ∈ N). Note that if this is not the case, we set k = max i∈N k i , and we extend v :
This amounts to duplicating the last element k i of L i when k i < k. Under this assumption, we recover well-known concepts.
When k = 1, v is a pseudo-Boolean function v : {0, 1} N → R vanishing at 0 N . Equivalently, it can be seen as a set function v : 2 N → R, with v(∅) = 0, which is a game in cooperative game theory. A capacity (Choquet, 1953) or fuzzy measure (Sugeno, 1974 ) is a monotone game, i.e., satisfying v(A) ≤ v(B) whenever A ⊆ B. For the general case (when k ≥ 1), v : L → R fulfilling (1) corresponds exactly to the concept of multichoice game (Hsiao and Raghavan, 1993) , and the numbers 0, 1, . . . , k in L i are seen as the levels of activity of the players. A k-ary capacity (Grabisch and Labreuche, 2003 ) is a multichoice game v satisfying the monotonicity condition: or each x, y ∈ L s.t. x ≤ y, v(x) ≤ v(y) and the normalization condition: v(k, . . . k) = 1. Hence, a k-ary capacity represents a preference on L which is increasing with the value of the attributes.
Consider the following example in which decision strategies depend on the values of the attributes.
Example 1 (System engineers). Consider an engineering problem with two performance criteria (e.g., the latency of the system and the quality of the system) evaluated on the scale {0, 1, 2}, where 0 means that the performance is not met, 1 means that the performance is medium, and 2 means that the performance is completely met. Consider the following 2-ary capacity representing the overall satisfaction on the system (the preferences are depicted in Figure 1 ):
For x ∈ {0, 1} 2 , the decision maker is not satisfied at all when one criterion is not met at all, and the other one is at most medium. This corresponds to an intolerant behaviour. On the other hand, for x ∈ {1, 2} 2 , the decision maker is completely satisfied when one criterion is completely met and the other one is at least medium. This corresponds to a tolerant behaviour. Any multichoice game v can be written as:
where m v (x), x ∈ L, is the Möbius transform of v (Rota, 1964) given by
and u x is a multichoice game (called the unanimity multichoice game) defined by
Note that the games u x , x ∈ L \ {0 N }, are linearly independent, and form a basis of the vector space of multichoice games. We denote by G(L) the set of multichoice games defined on L, and G + (L) the set of multichoice games whose Möbius transform is nonnegative. Any multichoice game v can be uniquely decomposed into
Another family of games which form a basis is the family of Dirac games, defined for every x ∈ L \ {0 N } by
This yields the decomposition
The
The general expression for the derivative of v ∈ G(L) is given by,
Observe that ∆ ∅ v = v. For T ⊆ N , we denote by G T (L) the set of multichoice games whose derivative w.r.t. T and derivative w.r.t. any subset S ⊆ N \ T such that S = ∅ are nonnegative.
The following lemma gives a general expression for the derivative in terms of the Möbius transform.
Proof. Let us proceed by induction on |T |. For |T | = 0, we have
Assume the formula holds for |T | = and let us prove it still holds for T ∪ {i} with |T | = and i ∈ N \ T . We have, for any x ∈ L such that ∀j ∈ T ∪ {i}, x j < k,
Let us remark that, if v ∈ G + (L) then its derivative w.r.t. any element is nonnegative everywhere.
Values and interaction indices 3.1 The case of classical TU-games
In cooperative game theory, the notion of value or power index is one of the most important concepts. A value is a function φ : G(2 N ) → R N which assigns a payoff vector to any game v ∈ G(2 N ). In MCDA, values are interpreted as importance indices for criteria. The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of player i ∈ N is given by
The concept of interaction index, which is an extension of that of value, was introduced axiomatically to measure the interaction phenomena among players in cooperative game theory or criteria in multicriteria decision analysis. For a game v ∈ G(2 N ), the interaction index of v is a function I v : 2 N → R that assigns to every coalition T ⊆ N its interaction degree. Murofushi and Soneda (1993) proposed an interaction index I(ij) for a pair of elements i, j ∈ N to estimate to which degree i and j interact. Grabisch (1997) defined and extended the interaction index to coalitions containing more than two players. The interaction index (Grabisch, 1997) 
Note that when S = {i}, the interaction index coincides with the Shapley value. Moreover that the expression is still valid for S = ∅, and represents in MCDA the average value of the Choquet integral w.r.t. v over [0, 1] n . It is thus closely related to the so-called "orness".
A first axiomatization of the interaction index has been proposed by Grabisch and Roubens (1999) , and it is axiomatized in a way similar to the Shapley value. The following axioms have been considered by Grabisch and Roubens :
• Linearity axiom (L): I v (S) is linear on G(2 N ) for every nonempty S ⊆ N .
• Dummy axiom (D): For any v ∈ G(2 N ), and any i ∈ N dummy for v,
• Symmetry axiom (S) : For any v ∈ G(2 N ), any permutation σ on N and any nonempty S ⊆ N , I
v (S) = I σv (σS).
• Efficiency axiom (E) : For any v ∈ G(2 N ) and
• Recursive axiom (R1): For any v ∈ G(2 N ) and any S ⊆ N, s > 1,
where v −j is the game v restricted to elements in N \ j, defined by v −j (S) = v(S), ∀S ⊆ N \ j, and v −j ∪j is the game on N \ j in the presence of j defined by v
• Recursive axiom (R2): For any v ∈ G(2 N ) and any S ⊆ N, s > 1,
where v [S] is the game where all elements in S are considered as a single element denoted [S] , and defined by, for any K ⊆ N \ S:
Axiom (R1) says that the interaction of the players in S is equal to the interaction between the criteria in S \ j in the presence of j minus the interaction between the criteria of S \ j in the absence of j. Axiom (R2) expresses interaction of S in terms of all successive interactions of subsets. The authors have shown that (R1) and (R2) are equivalent under (L), (D) and (S) axioms.
The following theorem was shown by Grabisch and Roubens (1999) .
3.2 The case of games on lattices Grabisch and Labreuche (2007) generalized the notion of interaction defined for criteria modelled by capacities, by considering functions defined on lattices. The interaction (Grabisch and Labreuche, 2007) is based on the notion of derivative of a function defined on a lattice. For this, they introduced the following definitions:
and the derivative of v w.r.t. y at x is given by:
The following definition has been proposed in (Grabisch and Labreuche, 2007) :
where, A(x) = {y ∈ L|y j = k or 0 if j / ∈ J, y j = x j − 1 else }, h(y) is the number of components of y to k and α
Characterization of the importance index for multichoice games
In this section, we present the importance index (value) for multichoice games defined by Ridaoui et al. (2017b) together with its axiomatization. Let φ be a value defined for any v ∈ G(L).
Symmetry axiom (S): For any permutation σ of N ,
Invariance axiom (I): Let us consider two games v, w ∈ G(L) such that, for some i ∈ N ,
Note that the modulo means that for x i = 0, the condition reads 
Theorem 2. Let φ be a value defined for any v ∈ G(L). If φ fulfills (L), (I), (S) and (E) then
5 Axiomatization of the signed interaction index
In this section we intend to define axiomatically an interaction index for multichoice games, which we call signed interaction index as it can take positive or negative values. The approach presented here is based on a recursion formula, starting from the importance index (value) defined in Section 4, as in (Grabisch and Roubens, 1999 ). An interaction index of the k-ary
The first axiom (L) is trivially generalized for the interaction index.
Proof . It is easy to check that the above formula satisfies the linearity axiom. Conversely, we consider I v satisfying (L). Using the decomposition with Dirac games (3) and (L), we get
, ∀x ∈ L, ∀T ∈ 2 N \ {∅}, we obtain the wished result.
Remark 1. Let i ∈ N be a null criterion for v ∈ G(L). We have,
Proposition 2. Under axioms (L) and (N), for every nonempty T ⊆ N , there exist real constants b
To prove this result, the following lemmas are useful.
Proof . Let A ⊆ N . We proceed by induction on |A|. The relation is obviously true for |A| = 0. Let us suppose that the relation is true for any set A of at most l − 1 elements, and try to show it is also true for any set A of l elements. We have , for all x A ∈ L A \{k} A ,
Proof . We shall proceed by induction on n. For simplicity, we denote N \ i by S,
The relation is obviously true for n = 1. Let us suppose that the relation is true for any set of at most n − 1 elements, and try to show it is also true for any set of n elements. We
which is the desired result.
We now prove Proposition 2.
Proof . It is easy to check that the formula satisfies the axioms. Conversely, we consider I v satisfying (L) and (N). Let v ∈ G(L) and T ∈ 2 N \ {∅}. By Proposition 1, there exists a T x ∈ R, for all x ∈ L, such that,
Then,
Assume now that i is null for v. We have v(
By (N), we have, for all i ∈ T null, and for all x −i ∈ L −i ,
Therefore, it suffices to replace the values of a T x in the formula (6), and then the result is established.
The next axiom generalizes the invariance axiom introduced for the importance index.
Invariance axiom (I): Let us consider two functions v, w ∈ G(L) and a nonempty set T ⊆ N such that, for all i ∈ T ,
Proposition 3. Under axioms (L), (N) and (I), ∀v ∈ G(L), ∀T ∈ 2 N \ {∅},
Proof . It is easy to check that the above formula satisfies the axioms. Conversely, we consider I v satisfying (L), (N) and (I). Let v, w ∈ G(L) such that v, w satisfy the premise of the Invariance axiom and consider T ∈ 2 N \ {∅}. By Proposition 2, we have, for any
and,
Then, by (I), b
We conclude that the coefficient b
. Hence, for any v ∈ G(L), and for any T ∈ 2 N \ {∅}, we have,
We introduce the Symmetry axiom.
Symmetry axiom (S):
For all v ∈ G(L), for all permutation σ on N ,
where b x T ;n 0 ,n 1 ,...,n k ∈ R, and n j = |{ ∈ N \ T, x = j}| Proof . Let v ∈ G(L) and let σ be a permutation on N . For every x ∈ L, we put y = σ −1 (x). From Proposition 2, we have ∀T ∈ 2 N \ {∅}
Then, from the symmetry axiom, we have for all y ∈ L such that y T < k T : b
For every y ∈ L such that y T < k, we can write,
For a fixed T = ∅, b T (y T ;σ(y) −σ(T ) ) depends only on n(y −T ), with n(y −T ) = {n 0 (y −T ), . . . , n k (y −T )}, and n j (y −T ) = |{ ∈ N \ T |y = j}|.
Suppose now that σ(T ) = S (with S = T ), and σ( ) = , ∀ ∈ N \ S ∪ T , then,
we can conclude that the value b T y T ;n(y −T ) does not depend on the exponent T . We denote by b y T ;n(y −T ) this value.
Proposition 5. Under axioms (L), (N), (I) and (S), for any v ∈ G(L) and any nonempty
where b n(x −T ) ∈ R, n(x −T ) = (n 0 , n 1 , . . . , n k ) and n j = |{ ∈ N \ T, x = j}|
We introduce now the Recursivity axiom which is the exact counterpart of the one for classical games in (Grabisch and Roubens, 1999) . For this, we introduce the following definitions.
Let v be a multichoice game in G(L) and S ⊆ N . We introduce the restricted multichoice game v −S of v, which is defined on N \ S as follows
The restriction of v to N \ i in the presence of i, denoted by v
Recursivity axiom (R): For any v ∈ G(L),
Lemma 4. Under axioms (L), (N), (I) (S) and (R), for any v ∈ G(L), for any nonempty T ⊆ N ,
with v
is the reduced multichoice game of v to T with respect to A defined on the set {0, . . . , k} (N \T )∪[A] as follows:
Proof . We suppose that the axioms (L), (N), (I), (S) and (R) are satisfied. We proceed by induction on |T | =: t. The formula is true for t = 1. Let us assume it is true up to t = − 1 ≥ 1, and try to prove it for t = elements. By induction assumption we have, for any v ∈ G(L), and i ∈ T ,
By (R), we have
Theorem 3. There is a unique interaction index satisfying (L), (N), (I), (S), (E) and (R), which is the signed interaction index given by
Proof . Let v ∈ G(L), and T ∈ 2 N \ {∅}. By axioms (L), (N), (I), (S) and (E), we have
By Lemma 4, we have
Observe that as for the interaction index for classical games, the formula is still valid for T = ∅.
Example 2 (System engineers (continued)). Consider the 2-ary capacity v given in Example 1. The computation of the signed interaction index w.r.t. v gives
The signed interaction index indicates that there is no interaction among criteria. Evidently, this is counterintuitive because the two criteria (latency of the system and quality of the system) interact with one another, as depicted in Figure 1 . This is because the interaction effects existing in the subdomain {1, 2}
2 of L cancel the interaction effects in the subdomain {0, 1} 2 : interaction is positive in the latter, and negative in the former.
The above example motivates the introduction of another interaction index which does not permit cancellation between positive and negative interaction, just by considering absolute interaction effects. This is the object of the next section.
Axiomatization of the absolute interaction index
In this section, we propose an axiomatic approach to define an interaction index which has the following general form:
where, for any nonempty T ⊆ N , {b T x | x ∈ L, x T < k T } is a family of real coefficients. As this index is not linear, the axiomatization scheme cannot be based on linearity as the previous one, and we follow the scheme taken in (Ridaoui et al., 2017a) for the absolute importance index. The two first axioms are a kind a replacement of linearity.
Conic Combination axiom (CC)
Proposition 6. Under axioms (CC) and (D), for all nonempty T ⊆ N , there exists constants a
Proof. Let v ∈ G + (L). By using the basis of unanimity multichoice games and applying (CC) we find for every nonempty T ⊆ N ,
Since m v (x) is a linear combination of all coefficients v(y), y ∈ L, a rearrangement of terms leads to the following formula:
where a T y are real constants independent from v. We have for every T ∈ 2 N \ {∅} and v ∈ G T (L),
Marginal contribution axiom (MC):
Remark 2. The Null Axiom (N) is implied by (CC) and (MC) (or (D) and (MC)). Indeed, the (CC) axiom or (D) implies I 0 (T ) = 0 for any T ⊆ N , where 0 is the null game, and if i is a null criterion for a multichoice game v such that T i, then
Proposition 7. Under axioms (CC), (D) and (MC), for all nonempty T ⊆ N , there exists constants b
To prove this proposition, the following Lemma is useful.
Define inductively the following multichoice game w:
• w(0, . . . , 0) = 0,
By construction, we have for every
and if x = (0 T , x −T ), we have
Hence, w is a multichoice game such that ∆ T w(x) ≥ 0 and
) with x −T ∪S∪A > 0, and we set −T ∪A = (x S + 1 S , x −T ∪A∪S ). We distinguish the two following cases:
we take B = S, y T = 0 T and y S = x S + 1 S , we obtain
and for every
we take B = S, y T = x T and y S = x S + 1 S , we obtain
We now prove Proposition 7.
It is clear that Formula (13) satisfies (MC). Let us check that it satisfies (CC) and (D). Let v, w ∈ G + (L), and T ∈ 2 N \ {∅}. For any α ∈ R + , we have
and the (CC) axiom is satisfied. If now v − w ∈ G T (L), we have ∆ T (v − w) ≥ 0, and then
Hence, (D) is satisfied. Conversely, we consider I satisfying the axioms (CC), (D) and (MC).
By Remark 2 , I satisfies the Null axiom for any multichoice game. Then we deduce by (11) and Proposition 2
And by axiom (MC) we have,
(the proof works as in the case of Proposition 3)
This axiom says that i, j ∈ N are symmetric for the Dirac games, if they are in the kernel, or outside the support. It means that the interaction for Dirac games does not depend on the labelling of the players in the kernel, or outside the support.
Take now x ∈ L \ {0 N } such that κ(x) = 0 and remark that i∈N \T I δx
We also note that I δx s (T ∪ i) is positive for i ∈ K(x), i / ∈ T , and I δx
This can be interpreted as the total interaction of elements in K(x) \ T is equal to the total interaction of terms in N \ Σ(x) ∪ T. We then propose the following axiom.
In all previous axioms, the Interaction is given up to a dilation coefficient. In order to fix this coefficient, we introduce a calibration axiom taking the previous case when Σ(x) = N .
Theorem 4. There is a unique interaction index satisfying (CC), (D), (I), (MC), (SD), (AE) and (C), which is the absolute interaction index given by
Proof. It is clear that the above formula satisfies (CC), (D), (I), (MC).
We show that I a satisfies (SD), (AE) and (C). Let x ∈ L \ {0 N } and T ⊆ N, T = ∅, and for any i ∈ N \ T , we set p
• Suppose T ⊆ K(x) ∪ N \ Σ(x) with T = K(x) and T = N \ Σ(x). For any i, j ∈ K(x) such that i, j / ∈ T , we have
and for any i, j ∈ N \ Σ(x), we have
Hence, (SD) is satisfied.
• If κ(x) = 0, and T K(x) ∪ N \ Σ(x) , we have
We set S = Σ(x) \ K(x), and x T = (0 A , k T \A ), with A ⊆ T . We have
Conversely, we consider I satisfying the axioms (CC), (D), (I), (MC), (SD), (AE) and (C).
By Proposition 8, we have for any T ⊆ N, T = ∅
Then we obtain, Then by (16), we obtain
therefore, for any T ⊆ M, T = ∅,
Note that, alike the signed interaction index, the expression is still valid for T = ∅.
Example 3 (System engineers (continued)). Consider the 2-ary capacity v given in Example 1. The computation of the absolute interaction index w.r.t. v gives
The absolute interaction index shows that there is a synergy of information between criteria, which was not visible using the signed interaction index.
Interaction indices for the Choquet integral
We propose in this section an interpretation of the interaction in continuous spaces, that is, after extending v to the continuous domain [0, k] N . The most usual extension of v on [0, k] N is the Choquet integral with respect to k-ary capacities (Grabisch and Labreuche, 2003) .
where µ z is a capacity given by
For any T ⊆ N , we define inductively the variation of C v at z w.r.t. T by
Generalizing the above definitions, the variation of C v at z w.r.t. T is
We begin by giving a formula relating the (signed) interaction index to the interaction index for classical games. In the formula below, as well as in the whole section, we consider the expression of the interaction index extended to 2 N .
Proposition 9. For every v ∈ G(L),
where I Sh is the interaction index for classical games given in (4).
To prove this result, the following combinatorial result is useful.
Lemma 6.
We now prove Proposition 9.
Thus, the signed interaction index on L takes the form of the sum over all the cells of the grid L, where in each cell the interaction index for the local (classical) game is taken.
Theorem 5. Let v be a k-ary capacity.
Lemma 7. The Choquet integral at point z ∈ [0, k] N w.r.t. a unanimity multichoice game u x , x ∈ L is given by
Proof. Let u x , x ∈ L a unanimity multichoice game, and let z ∈ [0, k] N . There are three different cases,
we have v x (z) = 1, and µ z (A) = 0 for any A ⊂ N , then C vx (z) = 1.
• Case 2 : ∃i ∈ N such that x i > z i + 1, we have v x (z) = 0 et µ z (A) = 0 for any A ⊂ N , then C vx (z) = 0.
• Case 3 : ∃i ∈ N such that x i > z i , we have v x (z) = 0 and µ z (A) = µ S (A) for any A ⊂ N , with µ S a unanimity capacity and S = {i ∈ N :
Proof. Let z ∈ [0, k] N , ∀T ⊆ N and ∀L ⊆ T , we have by linearity of the Choquet integral w.r.t. games, by Lemma 7 and (2),
i∈N \(T \L):
i∈N \T :
We use the following expression ∀T ⊆ N,
and the definition of ∆ T C v . We get:
the lemma is proved.
We now prove Theorem 5.
Proof . Let v a k-ary capacity. For every T ⊆ N , we have, We use the expression of interaction index for capacities in terms of the Mobius representation (Grabisch et al., 2000) , and by Proposition (9), we get
The interaction index on continous domain appears as the mean of relative amplitude of the range of C v w.r.t. T , when the remaining variables take uniformly random values. The total variation is the local interaction of C v at point z.
Example 4 (System engineers (continued)). Consider the 2-ary capacity v given in Example 1. By applying the formula of Theorem 5 we find 0, and therefore the theorem is satisfied in the example.
Remark 3. It is interesting to compare the expression of the interaction index obtained in Theorem 5 with the general expression of the interaction index for an arbitrary aggregation function F defined on some domain [a, b] n and taking value in [a, b] (see (Grabisch et al., 2009, Sec. 10.4) ):
where T ⊆ N and ∆ T F (x) is the total variation of F w.r.t. T at x, defined by
Applying this formula to F = C v on [0, k] n we find:
The difference in the normalizing coefficient comes from the axioms we have chosen, essentially the efficiency axiom. Indeed, it is possible to recover exactly I T (C v ) if in the efficiency axiom (E), we divide the right hand side of the equality by k n (this would express an efficiency or average variation per cell in the grid, compared to a total variation on the grid), and in the recursivity axiom (R), we multiply by k the right hand side (since it concerns games with n − 1 players).
